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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) includes a permanent revenue transfer method-
ology which provides financial incentives to health insurance plans that have
higher than average actuarial risk. In this paper, we derive some statistical im-
plications of the revenue transfer methodology in the ACA. We treat as random
variables the revenue transfers between individual insurance plans in a given mar-
ketplace, where each plan’s revenue transfer amount is measured as a percentage
of the plan’s total premium. We analyze the means and variances of those ran-
dom variables, and deduce from the zero sum nature of the revenue transfers that
there is no limit to the magnitude of revenue transfer payments relative to plans’
total premiums. Using data provided by the American Academy of Actuaries
and by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, we obtain an explanation
for empirical phenomena that revenue transfers were more variable and can be
substantially greater for insurance plans with smaller market shares. We show
that it is often the case that an insurer which has decreasing market share will
also have increased volatility in its revenue transfers.
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1 Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, known colloquially as the “Afford-
able Care Act” (ACA) or “Obamacare,” provided several measures to assist insurers
with the financial expenses of meeting the new health insurance requirements. One
such measure, included in the ACA permanently, is a revenue transfer methodology
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to promote the equitable acceptance of risk by all insurance plans in a given market-
place. These revenue transfers were to be done by means of a zero sum procedure
which reallocated funds from health insurance plans that have experienced lower than
average actuarial risk to plans that have experienced higher than average actuarial risk
(Kautter et al. 2014, p. 1).
It was later observed empirically, however, that the magnitude of revenue transfers,
where each transfer payment is measured as a percentage of a plan’s total premium,
often were greater for insurance plans having smaller market share than for plans with
larger market share. It was also noticed that the volatility of revenue transfers often
was greater for smaller plans than for larger plans (American Academy of Actuaries
2016, p. 10; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2016, p. 97). These phenomena
led to financial strain for some small insurance plans in Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, and other states; and we refer to Herman (2016a,
2016b), Gantz (2016), Bryant (2017), Teichert (2016) and others for accounts of the
ensuing financial and legal struggles, and subsequent insolvency, of some plans.
In this paper, we provide theoretical explanations for these empirical phenomena.
We deduce, purely from the zero-sum nature of the revenue transfer methodology, that
there is no limit to the magnitude of revenue transfers relative to a plan’s premiums.
By treating revenue transfers as random variables and investigating their means, we
deduce that mean revenue transfers can be far greater, relative to premiums, for smaller
plans than for larger plans. Second, by studying the variances of revenue transfers, we
explain why the volatility of those amounts can be greater for smaller plans than for
larger plans.
Third, we apply elementary linear algebra and calculus to determine conditions
under which the variance of a given plan’s revenue transfer is certain to increase as
the plan’s market share decreases, and we show how to construct examples for which
decreasing market share leads to increasing variability in revenue transfers. For smaller
plans, the generally high-magnitude revenue transfers and the increased volatility of
those payments will place them at increased risk of insolvency, as was the outcome for
some small plans in several of the aforementioned states.
Our results apply, beyond the Affordable Care Act, to any health insurance system
in which risk equalization is based on zero-sum revenue transfer procedures.
2 The revenue transfer system and some of its implications
Let n denote the number of insurance plans in a given ACA marketplace. For i =
1, . . . , n, denote by si the market share of the ith plan. Clearly, si > 0 for all i, and
s1 + · · · + sn = 1 because all plans in a marketplace jointly enroll that marketplace’s
entire ACA membership.
For i = 1, . . . , n, we denote by Ti the revenue transfer per member month for the
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ith plan, the transfer amounts being calculated as a percentage of total premiums.
Numerous actuarial factors are used to define Ti (see, e.g., Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act 2013, pp. 15430–15432; Pope et al. 2014, pp. E3-E5 and E19).
The payment amounts T1, . . . , Tn are defined so as to reward equitable risk acceptance
by all insurance plans. A positive value of Ti corresponds to a payment to the ith
insurance plan when that plan has experienced higher than average actuarial risk, and
negative values of Ti correspond to a charge imposed on the ith plan when that plan
has experienced lower than average actuarial risk.
The revenue transfer procedure is designed to be a “zero sum” system. Specifically,
the weighted sum of all transfer payments equals zero:
n∑
i=1
siTi = 0. (2.1)
This zero sum requirement ensures that plans receiving payments are balanced by
charges to other plans, so the total amount of funds flowing between insurance plans is
unchanged (Pope et al. 2014).
Although the revenue transfer methodology and the zero-sum condition is intended
to enable equitable actuarial risk across all insurance plans in a marketplace, it is
the individual values of the Ti which are likely to be of primary interest to specific
insurance plans. Therefore, we discuss the set of possible values of the Ti which arise
from Eq. (2.1).
Consider a simple case in which there are three plans in an insurance marketplace.
If s1 and T1 are specified then we obtain from Eq. (2.1) the equation,
s2T2 + s3T3 = −s1T1,
where s2, s3 > 0, and s2 + s3 = 1 − s1. For any value of s2 such that 0 < s2 < 1 − s1
and for any value of T2, we can determine from the latter equation a value for T3.
Therefore, if there are three or more plans in a marketplace then no uniform bound
on the magnitude of revenue transfers for all other plans can be determined from a
knowledge of the revenue transfer payment for a single plan. This lack of a uniform
bound subjects individual plans to potentially unlimited revenue transfers. Conse-
quently, lesser capitalized insurance plans are likely to be at greater risk of insolvency.
We assume that the market shares s1, . . . , sn are deterministic. We also assume that
each Ti is a random variable and that it has finite mean and variance. Denote by µi
the expected value of Ti, i = 1, . . . , n; taking expectations in Eq. (2.1) and solving for
µn, we obtain
µn = −
1
sn
n−1∑
i=1
siµi. (2.2)
Suppose that sn is small. For given values of µ1, . . . , µn−1 and given values of s1, . . . , sn−1,
the outcome of division in Eq. (2.2) by sn may result in a number, µn, whose magnitude
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is large. This shows that an insurer with small market share will be at risk of having a
highly negative revenue transfer amount, in which case the insurer will be at great risk
of insolvency. (We also note that a limit on the magnitude of revenue transfers was
requested by a group, Consumers for Health Options, Insurance Coverage In Exchanges
in States (2016, p. 14) “to avoid financial harm to insurers”.)
These observations are consistent with empirical data. In a publication by the
American Academy of Actuaries (2016, p. 10), Figure 4 in that report is a scatterplot
of revenue transfers vs. insurance plan market shares for 2014, which shows that plans
with small market shares often had revenue transfer amounts of very large magnitudes.
A discussion paper from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2016, p. 97,
Figures 5.2 and 5.3) shows that smaller insurers can have highly negative revenue
transfer payments, particularly so in the Small Group Market.
3 Implications for the variance of revenue transfers
We denote Var(Ti), the variance of Ti, by σi,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, we denote Cov(Ti, Tj),
the covariance between Ti and Tj, by σi,j , 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. To analyze the variance of
revenue transfers, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. The variance of Tn, the revenue transfer for the nth insurance plan,
is given by
σn,n =
1
s2n
( n−1∑
i=1
s2iσi,i + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤n−1
sisjσi,j
)
. (3.1)
Proof. By Eq. (2.1),
− snTn =
n−1∑
j=1
sjTj. (3.2)
We now calculate the variance of each side of this equation, applying to the right-hand
side a well-known formula for the variance of a linear combination of random variables
(Ross 2006, p. 357). Then, we obtain
s2nσn,n = Var(−snTn) = Var
( n−1∑
j=1
sjTj
)
=
n−1∑
j=1
s2jVar(Tj) + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤n−1
sisjCov(Ti, Tj)
=
n−1∑
j=1
s2jσj,j + 2
∑
1≤i<j≤n−1
sisjσi,j.
Dividing both sides of this equation by s2n, we obtain Eq. (3.1).
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Consider the case in which sn is small. Since s
2
n < sn then division by s
2
n in Eq. (3.1)
could result in large values of σn,n. Therefore, an insurance plan with a small market
share is in danger of having revenue transfer payments which have very large variance.
This observation also is consistent with empirical data. The report of the American
Academy of Actuaries (2016, p. 10) shows that the variability of revenue transfers in-
creases substantially as market share decreases. The report of the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (2016, p. 97) indicates that the variability of revenue transfers
generally is higher for smaller insurers than for larger insurers.
We now analyze the nature of changes in σn,n in response to changes in sn. We are
particularly interested in deriving general conditions under which σn,n increases as sn
decreases, because such an event likely will place insurers who are losing enrollees in
an even more precarious situation.
Let Λ be the covariance matrix of (T1, . . . , Tn−1); then, Λ is a (n − 1) × (n − 1)
positive semidefinite matrix. As the Ti are functions of s1, . . . , sn−1, it will usually
be the case that Λ also is a function of s1, . . . , sn−1; nevertheless, we proceed further
with the simplifying assumption that Λ is not dependent on s1, . . . , sn−1. As the ensu-
ing theoretical calculations still lead to conclusions that are consistent with empirical
observations, we infer that the dependence of Λ on s1, . . . , sn−1 often is weak.
LetΣ = (σi,j) denote the covariance matrix of (T1, . . . , Tn) and σ = (σ1,n, . . . , σn−1,n)
′
be the (n−1)×1 column vector containing the covariances between Tn and (T1, . . . , Tn−1)
′.
Then,
Σ =
(
Λ σ
σ
′ σn,n
)
. (3.3)
We now establish a necessary and sufficient condition for σn,n to increase as sn decreases.
Proposition 2. For σn,n to increase as sn decreases, it is necessary and sufficient that
σi,n ≤ σn,n for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Proof. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn−1)
′, written as a (n− 1)× 1 column vector. By Eq. (3.1),
σn,n = s
−2
n s
′Λs. (3.4)
Let e = (1, . . . , 1)′ be the (n − 1) × 1 column vector whose components all equal 1.
Then sn = 1− s1 − · · · − sn−1 = 1− e
′
s, and it follows from Eq. (3.4) that
σn,n = (1− e
′
s)−2 · s′Λs.
Applying the gradient ∇ = (∂/∂s1, . . . , ∂sn−1)
′ and simplifying the result, we obtain
∇σn,n =
2[(s′Λs)e+ (1− e′s)Λs]
(1− e′s)3
. (3.5)
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By Eq. (3.3), the (i, j)th entry of Λ is σi,j , i, j = 1, . . . , n − 1; so, by straightforward
matrix multiplication, the ith component of the vector Λs is
∑n−1
j=1
σi,jsj. However,
n−1∑
j=1
σi,jsj =
n−1∑
j=1
Cov(Ti, Tj)sj = Cov
(
Ti,
n−1∑
j=1
sjTj
)
.
Applying (3.2), we obtain
n−1∑
j=1
σi,jsj = Cov(Ti,−snTn) = −snCov(Ti, Tn) = −snσi,n,
for all i = 1, . . . , n− 1; therefore,
Λs = −snσ. (3.6)
We now substitute this result into Eq. (3.5), and also substitute sn for 1 − e
′
s and
s2nσn,n for s
′Λs. Then we obtain
∇σn,n =
2(s2nσn,ne− s
2
nσ)
s3n
=
2(σn,ne− σ)
sn
.
Therefore, the ith component of ∇σn,n is nonnegative if and only if the corresponding
component of σn,ne− σ is nonnegative.
As the ith component of σn,ne−σ is σn,n−σi,n, we find that if sn decreases, which is
equivalent to an increase in at least one of s1, . . . , sn−1, the condition that σn,n−σi,n ≥ 0
for all i implies that ∇σn,n ≥ 0, hence σn,n will increase.
Note that it also follows from Eqs. (3.1), (3.3), and (3.6) that the covariance matrix
Σ can be expressed entirely in terms of Λ, s, and sn as
Σ =
(
Λ −s−1n Λs
−s−1n s
′Λ s−2n s
′Λs
)
. (3.7)
Example. Suppose that n = 3 and that s1 = 0.90, s2 = 0.06, and s3 = 0.04. Here,
the first insurance plan has a market share of 90%, which is substantially larger than
its competitors. Although the respective market shares, 6% and 4%, of the second and
third plans are close to each other, the consequences for the smallest plan are highly
negative. We suppose that
Λ =
(
4.0 −0.6
−0.6 3.0
)
,
and then, by Eq. (3.7)
Σ =

 4.0 −0.6 −89.1−0.6 3.0 9.0
−89.1 9.0 1991.25

 . (3.8)
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Note that σ3,3 = 1991.25, which is substantially larger than σ1,1 = 4.0 and σ2,2 = 3.0. It
is ominous for the smallest plan that the variance of its revenue transfers is enormously
greater than the corresponding variances for its larger competitors.
Also, the conditions of Proposition 2 are easily satisfied in this example, so it follows
that the variance of revenue transfers for the smallest plan will increase as its market
share decreases.
These results indicate that, for any n, it is straightforward to find examples for
which the variance of the revenue transfers for a given health insurance plan increases
as its market share decreases. We can use the statistical package R (R Core Team
2013) to generate examples of Σ that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2, and it is
our experience that many such examples exist.
4 Conclusions
This paper demonstrates three consequences of the revenue transfer methodology in
the Affordable Care Act (ACA). First, we show that there is no practical limit on the
magnitude of average revenue transfers. In the case of insurance marketplace plans
with smaller market shares and which typically have less capital, the lack of such a
limit increases their risk of insolvency.
Second, we show that there is no theoretical limit on the variance of revenue transfer
payments. Again in the case of smaller insurance plans, any high volatility in their
transfer payments places them at increased risk of insolvency.
Third, we observe that the variance of the revenue transfer for a given plan often can
increase as the plan market share decreases, and we find explicit statistical conditions
under which this increase in variance is guaranteed to occur, and we show that the
increase holds in cases beyond those conditions. In the case of smaller plans, the
generally higher transfer payments and increased volatility of those payments place
them at heightened risk of insolvency.
In any revision of the ACA, these properties of the revenue transfer methodology
need to be addressed. Further, since our results arise purely as a consequence of the
zero sum nature of the revenue transfer process, our results are germane to any health
insurance system in which risk equalization is sought by means of zero sum transfer
procedures.
As we noted near the end of Section 2, some ACA participants have proposed that
the revenue transfer methodology be revised by placing limits on the magnitudes of
transfer amounts as a percentage of premiums. To explore this approach, suppose that
all the insurance plans in a given marketplace were to agree that it is equitable to limit
the magnitude of each plan’s transfer amount to 50% of that plan’s total premiums.
For simplicity, assume that there are two plans in that marketplace, one having a
market share of 20% and the other with market share 80%. Applying the zero-sum
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condition (2.1), we obtain 0.2 T1+0.8 T2 = 0; equivalently, T1 = −4T2. According to the
restrictions on transfer amounts, we also have |T1| ≤ 0.5 and |T2| ≤ 0.5; consequently,
|T1|= 4 |T2| ≤ 0.5, leading to the restriction |T2| ≤ 0.125. Therefore, in actuality, the
larger plan will have a limit of 12.5% on the magnitude of its transfer amounts, which
is substantially lower than the agreed-to limit of 50%. By contrast, the limit on the
magnitude of transfers for the smaller plan will remain at 50%, possibly placing that
plan at a disadvantage to the larger plan. This simple example reveals that the placing
of uniform limits on transfer amounts may put smaller plans in a precarious position
relative to their larger competitors.
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